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UK austerity and growth: Winter is coming
Danny Quah was one of the 20 prominent economists who backed the
government’s austerity programme in 2010. This year, he called for a shift of strategy
explaining that knowledge of the economy’s current state carries great uncertainty,
especially in extraordinary economic circumstances. Danny argues it is important to
constantly monitor the state of the economy as well as policy needs in order to respond to
changing circumstances. The international environment has shifted in such a way that the
urgency for UK rapid debt reduction has lessened, and the argument for effective growth
policies needs to be made.
Policy debate in the current recession is of ten
portrayed to be an irreconcilable polit ical battle,
pitt ing those pushing austerity against those
advocating growth. Indeed, substantive real
dif f erences do separate groups having dif f erent
views on what dif f erent policies can achieve.
Equally, uncertainty on the state of  the economy
clouds judgment on what appropriate policies
should be, especially so in t imes of  economic crisis.
This article examines that latter uncertainty. By
studying one example — UK policy options at the
beginning of  2010 — it argues we need to
understand better the implications of  dif f erent
measurements on an economy.
“You’re for me or against  me. Choose.”
No one wants to live in a stagnant economy. Even
those who don’t believe higher incomes make
people happier can’t bear to see their honest,
hardworking neighbours unable to make monthly
mortgage payment, or having to choose uncomf ortably between new clothes and shoes f or the kids or
f ood f or the table. No one wants to see masses of  unemployed on the streets. Everyone is f or growth.
But, at the same time, even the most diehard pro-growth proponents must acknowledge that government
ef f orts to f urther  increase growth cannot always be appropriate.  If  an economy were already close to
f ull employment or were in any other way overheated, then it is right f or f iscal and monetary stimulus to
withdraw. Raising tax revenues and lowering government spending — putting the government’s f inances
to order and restoring to health the nation’s balance sheets — all have a place in sensible, responsible
policy-making.
Standing f or growth does not mean constant and unwavering support f or always high government
spending and expansionary monetary policy. By the same token, backing policies to lower debt and
def icits does not mean wanting economic lif e to be wretched.  Even when the f inal goal is the same — to
have a healthy, prosperous, inclusive economy — depending on circumstances there is a t ime and place
f or dif f erent approaches to government policy.
A debate on UK growth versus austerity is on one level a debate about what policy transmission
mechanisms are most ef f ective f or bringing about long-run sustainable economic growth: People
disagree about what works. But equally important the debate is one about the current state of  the
economy. Only af ter the f act will it  become obvious what the right policy actions should have
been. Moreover, because of  lags in their ef f ectiveness, policy actions need to anticipate if  expansionary
ef f ects kick in only af ter the bottom of  the economic cycle has already passed, and thus overheat an
already healthy economy?
Many observers have f irm views, conditioned by sound economic analysis, on the f irst of  these issues,
what appropriate growth and austerity policies are. It strikes me, however, that the second matters much
more in extraordinary situations: in those circumstances, knowledge of  the current state of  the economy
necessarily carries f ar greater uncertainty. Generally, the range of  economic statistics to look at is broad
and constantly changing. External circumstances in a shif t ing world economy will conf ound historical
regularit ies. Economics education in every institution makes students understand mechanisms of  how
policies af f ect an economy, but hardly anywhere is there training on how to assess rigorously the state
of  an economy. That latter is merely “monitoring”. Perhaps accurately judging the state of  the economy is
impossible — but that doesn’t mean zero understanding is where one should stay.
Policy recommendations in a shift ing world economy
That this is important is usef ully emphasised by looking over a recent turn of  events.  In February 2010
twenty economists signed a letter to London’s Sunday Times supporting a plan to lower steadily the UK
structural budget def icit, starting as early as the 2010/11 f iscal year (f or transparency, I should say here I
was one of  those 20). The letter suggested that f ailure to do so could, among other things, raise
interest rates and undermine UK recovery, given how the economy had entered the recession with a large
structural budget def icit. Not unexpectedly, this proposal was not unif ormly accepted, and many
distinguished economists suggested instead that such a policy was potentially risky and that the f irst
priority had to be to restore robust growth. But to bring about growth was never a point of  dispute. So, it
might be usef ul now to look back and assess the balance of  risks then extant.
On the one hand, f or some observers, there has never been any doubt: “the UK had a depressed
economy then, and it still does now.” (Indeed, that particular writer upon reading that in August 2012
some of  the original group of  twenty had changed their minds expressed disappointment “to see so
many of  the prodigal economists asserting that they were responding to changed circumstances rather
than admitt ing that they simply got it wrong. For circumstances really haven’t changed [...].” (Again, f or
transparency, I was one of  those reported to have changed my mind, and indeed I was reported to have
emphasised changed circumstances.)
Did circumstances really remain f ixed, and were they really so transparent? Complicating the picture:
Statistics on recessions become available only with a f ixed delay — to be in recession, an economy has
to have had negative GDP growth over two successive quarters. So, to be in a double dip recession, well,
it ’s not enough just to announce one’s belief s, the data has to come out just so.
What did the world look like in early 2010?
Things look really bad: Major recession
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers had f iled f or bankruptcy. In January 2009 the IMF had predicted
world growth would f all to 0.5% f or the year ahead, only three months later to revise the f igure
signif icantly downwards to -1.3%. The World Bank had f orecast in March that the world economy would
contract by an even larger 1.7% in 2009: This would be the f irst decline in world GDP since the Second
World War. The International Labour Organization estimated that 51 million jobs would be destroyed in
2009, raising world unemployment to 7.1%. Growth in China had f allen f rom 9% in 2008 to an annual rate
of  6.1% in the f irst quarter of  2009, the lowest recorded f igure since 1992. Between July 2007 and
November 2008 world stock markets had lost US$26.4 trillion in value, more than half  of  world annual
GDP. In April 2009, Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s Chief  Economist, had written “the crisis appears to be
entering yet a new phase, in which a drop in conf idence is leading to a drop in demand, and a major
recession.” The UK had been of f icially in recession mid-2008, with the last two quarters of  2008
suf f ering declines in GDP.
Things looked grim.
Back o n track: By mid  2009 Asia’s ind ustrial p ro d ucatio n
had  re co ve re d  no t just to  p re -cris is  le ve ls b ut to  its  p re -
2008 g ro wth tre nd .
The return to growth?
By the beginning of  2010, the UK recession was already 18 months in train. In this modern era, advanced
economies (like the US) have only had short sharp downturns: the 11 US recessions since 1945
averaged only 11 months in duration, with the f our recessions between 1980 and 2001 lasting 6, 16, and
then 8 months twice, respectively. By 2007, the UK had gone 15 years since the end of  its last recession,
one that lasted just 15 months. Of  course, with hindsight, we now know it is well possible f or slumps
anywhere in the world to drag on, but set against both the UK’s own experience and against a broader
history (that of  advanced economies, like the US, towards which the UK had progressively become more
similar), it was not unreasonable to think by early 2010 that the UK was about ready to grow again.
No one would have reckoned in early 2010 that the global economy had regained robust health. Was it
equally apparent the international situation was dismal? By the f irst quarter of  2009, Brazil was reported
to be no longer in recession, having grown 2% af ter the two previous quarters of  GDP declines. The
OECD f orecast the Eurozone and the US would show posit ive growth in the last six months of  2009.
Early 2010 was six months past when incomes in
China and the rest of  emerging Asia had already
recovered. Industrial production was not just back to
pre-2008 heights, but to its extrapolated pre-2008
growth trend. The second quarter of  2009 saw a string
of  astounding f igures f rom across Asia: all at annual
rates, the South Korean economy grew by 2.3%, its
f astest expansion in over f ive years; the Chinese
economy grew 7.9%; the Malaysian economy expanded
by 4.8%; the Thai economy grew 2.3%; both Japan and
Hong Kong were showing rising incomes again, af ter
f our successive quarters of  GDP declines. Singapore
announced its emergence f rom recession, big-time,
with annualized GDP growth of  21% that quarter.
Sure, China’s government had announced in November
2008 a US$600bn (CNY4,000bn) f iscal stimulus
package. That by itself  was impressive enough, but
also most observers at the time believed growth in
export-oriented China and Asia occurred primarily f rom
Western demand. The East was growing again. Surely
the West must be demanding. It was natural to think that, somewhere somehow, the West must have
recovered.
Stimulus is an aircraft  carrier
That “somewhere, somehow” was not unreasonable to hypothesize in the slew of  policy actions
undertaken in all the world’s major economies between late 2007 and early 2010. In September 2008 the
US Federal Reserve, the Bank of  England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of  Japan, the Bank of
Canada, and the Swiss National Bank, in concert, added US$180bn of  liquidity to international money
money markets. By November 2008, in the space of  just f our months, the US Federal Reserve had
pumped US$592bn into the US$ monetary base, increasing that monetary base by 70%. In October 2008,
US lawmakers approved a US$700bn rescue package to purchase bad debt f rom US banks; the UK
government unveiled a ref orm package amounting to £400bn (i.e., again US$700bn) to provide f unds to
UK f inancial institutions; the Japanese government announced a US$270bn f iscal stimulus package
targeted at f amilies and small businesses. The f ollowing month saw China’s f iscal stimulus of  US$600bn
(already-mentioned) and the European Commission’s US$260bn recovery plan. Further add into the mix
Japan’s April 2009 stimulus package of  US$98.5bn or 2% of  that country’s GDP, and we’re talking
signif icant f iscal stimulus in all the world’s major economies.
It wasn’t all just f iscal expansion either. From a value of  6.25% in early August 2007, the US Federal
Reserve discount rate was reduced to 5.75% later that month, to 4.75% the month af ter, and then again
to 4.5% the month f ollowing. In January 2008 the Fed cut interest rates by 0.75 percentage points, the
largest single reduction in over a quarter of  a century. In October 2008, just one month af ter their
concerted action on international money market liquidity, six of  the world’s most important central banks
coordinated a simultaneous interest rate reduction of  0.5 percentage points. By the end of  October, the
US Federal Reserve had again slashed interest rates, this t ime down to 1%, the lowest level since
2004. The f ollowing month, the European Central Bank cut interest rates by 0.75 percentage points, its
largest ever single reduction; Sweden’s Riksbank, by a record 1.75 percentage points; the Bank of  Korea
by a record 1 percentage point; the Bank of  Canada lowered its benchmark rate to 1.5%, the lowest since
1958. In December, the US Federal Reserve’s discount rate had gotten down to between 0 and 0.25%;
Japan’s, 0.1%; China cut interest rates f or the f if th t ime in f our months. The f ollowing month, January
2009, the Bank of  England reduced its interest rate to 1.5%, the lowest setting in over 300 years of  the
Bank’s operation.
Monetary stimulus had by then become not just a matter of  reducing interest rates. Af ter all, interest
rates were already ef f ectively zero. In November 2008, the US Federal Reserve injected US$800bn into
the economy, buying US$600bn of  mortgage-backed securit ies and applying the remainder to unclog
consumer credit channels. The Bank of  England similarly engaged in quantitative easing, buying securit ies
with newly-printed money (£75bn in March 2008, and then £50bn in May and then again in August 2009)
to reach a total outlay of  £175bn (US$294bn) by the end of  2009. The European Central Bank, in June
2009, pumped US$628bn in one-year loans into the Eurozone’s banking system.
In the current Eurozone crisis, one hears talk of  the troika (the European Central Bank, the European
Union, and the IMF) taking a bazooka to the sovereign debt problem. If  so, the collection of  2008-2009
policy actions might seem more akin to sending in an entire aircraf t carrier.
The second quarter of  2009 recorded the of f icial end of  recessions not just in the East, as described
earlier, but also in the two largest Eurozone economies France and Germany, both seeing posit ive
growth again af ter f our consecutive quarters of  GDP declines. Financial institutions reported prof its:
notably Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase (prof its up 36% f rom the previous year), Deutsche Bank (up
67% over the same period in 2008), Barclays, RBS, Italy’s largest bank UniCredito, and the Dutch
f inancial services group ING. By September 2009, the FTSE 100 had again breached the 5,000-point
threshold, recovering completely all losses since October 2008.
Time to get ahead of the curve
Arrayed against this monetary and f iscal stimulus worldwide and the evidence of  the world economy
already growing again (admittedly most strongly in the East), one might conclude that policy-makers
ought now cast a cautious eye on government balance sheets.
But that decision, f or the UK, would still remain a balanced one. In September 2009 the OECD had
f orecast the UK would be the only G7 economy to still be in recession by the end of  the year, with both
the US and the Eurozone predicted to show two quarters of  consecutive growth. Three months earlier,
they had suggested the pace of  decline among its members was slowing and that the world economy had
nearly reached the bottom of  its worst post-War recession, but that the UK would continue to show zero
growth in 2010.
Ef f ects of  policies of ten only emerge with a lag. And, generally, government policy-making errs too of ten
by not getting ahead of  the curve. On top of  all that, the UK is a small open economy, and its debt and
output markets are strongly inf luenced by international developments. Was 2010 the right t ime to start
restoring the UK government’s balance sheet?
The UK’s debt/GDP ratio was in line with the largest Eurozone economies and theref ore larger than
Spain’s; its def icit/GDP ratio was worse than all except Ireland’s.
By July 2009, UK government debt had risen to 57% of  GDP, the highest ratio since 1974. That month,
the UK’s public sector net borrowing showed its f irst July def icit in 13 years. Earlier in the year, Spain had
become the f irst AAA-rated sovereign nation to have its credit rating downgraded since Japan in 2001. In
December 2009, Greece acknowledged sovereign debt exceeding €300bn (US$423bn), the highest in
modern history, result ing in a debt/GDP ratio of  113%, nearly double the Eurozone limit. The chart shows
the UK in 2010 right among the pack of  the largest European economies (the size of  each ball indicates
total GDP) in its debt/GDP ratio, i.e., larger than Spain’s, but with a worse def icit/GDP position than all
except Ireland.
In February 2010, it didn’t take a lot of  imagination to see how, all else equal, UK government borrowing
could easily have become just as expensive and as dif f icult as in the most stressed Eurozone
economies.
Backing off  from austerity
In retrospect, of  course, we know the austerity policy did not work in the UK. A reversal might well be
warranted, because circumstances had changed, not because things were the same.
Af ter the f irst couple months of  2010, the Eurozone economy went into f ree f all much f aster and much
f urther than one might have expected. This had two ef f ects on the UK f iscal posit ion: on the one hand,
UK debt turned out looking, well, not so bad af ter all relative to comparable advanced TransAtlantic
economies. The f ear that UK borrowing would become overly costly had become much less relevant.
On the other hand, the continued inability of  both sides
of  the Atlantic to resume economic growth meant a
f urther dramatic drag on UK economic perf ormance.
Unlike, say, Germany, the UK has historically
consistently exported mostly to the slowest-growing
advanced economies, and so this TransAtlantic
slowdown has considerably depressed the UK exports
and thus the UK economy (Germany, by contrast, today
exports more to Developing Asia than it does to the
US).
So, the international environment has shif ted in such a
way that the urgency f or UK rapid debt reduction has lessened.
The other large f actor is how market perception on the stance of  UK monetary policy too has shif ted.
For most observers now, the Bank of  England has made clear how it is willing to put even more
resources into monetary easing.
Conclusion
What can one conclude f rom this? First, policy-making needs to be sensit ive to circumstances, and today
in the UK, that means international circumstances especially. Monitoring and assessing the state of  the
world economy is needed. Second, expansionary policies need to be better designed. While austerity
might not, under the current circumstances, command the support it once did, pro-growth proponents
need to explain things better. Obviously, the world’s expansionary policies over 2008-2009 worked out
East, but then again they did nothing to revive the UK economy. Why will they do so now? How will this
time be dif f erent?
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. The UK’s sustained growth between 1997 and 2008 was f uelled by the importance of  skills and
new technology. Rather than just austerity, the government should f ocus on building human capital
and innovation to support long-term growth. (30.3)
2. George Osborne should change course on the economy and loosen the austerity programme
(22.6)
3. Labour must challenge the conventional wisdom of  neo- liberalism and articulate an alternative to
Austerity Britain where the state plays a posit ive role in delivering growth and raising living
standards (22.4)
4. Slow growth does not have to be our ‘new normal’. Government needs to change the way it looks
at the growth problem in the long term. (20.8)
